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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This chapter discusses various methods that have been used to estimate struc-
tural models of search and survival models. Most of the focus is on using avail-
able data, usually on unemployment spell lengths and accepted wage o¤ers, to
estimate the parameters of speci…c search models. In particular, we focus on
estimating the parameters of the wage o¤er distribution, the reservation wage
or reservation wage function, the cost of search, o¤er arrival rate, and discount
rate. There is an added section on survival models because survival models have
been used so extensively to look at unemployment spell data.
Throughout we describe actual models, estimation procedures, and issues
associated with identi…cation and estimation. There is not as much of an em-
phasis on results because we view the literature as still developing methodology.
The frontier of the methodology for structural models involves estimating equi-
librium search models and allowing for heterogeneity and interesting dynamics.
We also think identi…cation issues should receive more attention.
This chapter is divided up into sections. The next section presents the clas-
sical search model and how to estimate its parameters. We begin by presenting
early ”semi-structural” attempts to estimate the model. Next, there is a dis-
cussion on estimating a basic structural search model. We build on the basic
model by allowing for measurement error in wages, observed and unobserved
heterogeneity, right censoring, continuous time, and observed rejected o¤ers.
Next, there is a discussion of models with changing reservation wages.
The third section deals with survival analysis. We construct the basic Cox
proportional hazards model with unobserved heterogeneity and discuss how to
estimate the e¤ects of observed covariates, the parameters of the baseline haz-
ard function and the parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity density func-
tion. Then we discuss semiparametric approaches associated with estimating
the baseline hazard and unobserved heterogeneity density function.
The next section discusses empirical equilibrium search models. A few the-
oretical models are presented. Then we discuss how to estimate their structural
parameters and to deal with special problems associated with such models.
Given present data, identi…cation is an important issue. A conclusion ends the
paper.
12T h e C l a s s i c a l S e a r c h M o d e l
In this section, we present a simple version of a search model in discrete time.
Workers are in…nitely lived, wealth maximizing agents and discount the future
at a rate (1 + r)
¡1. At each moment, a worker can be employed or unemployed.
Unemployed workers search actively for job o¤ers. O¤ers are distributed accord-
ing to the density f (w) with …nite mean. At each period, an unemployed worker
incurs a cost of search c and receives a wage o¤er from one of many …rms in the
labor market. A wage o¤er represents a random draw from the time-invariant
distribution of wages known to the worker. Once a job is accepted, employment
lasts forever. The problem of the worker has the reservation property: there ex-
ists a value », called the reservation wage, such that it is optimal for the worker
to accept any wage o¤er if it is not smaller than » and to reject it otherwise.






(w ¡ »)f (w)dw ¡ c: (2.1)
The left-hand side of the equation (2.1) represents the bene…t associated with
working at the present period for a wage », while the right-hand side represents
the expected discounted bene…t of one more period of search if wages below » are
not acceptable to the worker. Consequently, at the reservation wage, the worker
is indi¤erent between accepting the present wage o¤er or searching one more
period. Notice that the left-hand side of equation (2.1) is strictly increasing in
», while the right-hand side is decreasing in ». Consequently, as long as the
cost of search is not too high, there exists a unique positive solution to the last
equation. A more rigorous discussion of this model is given by, for example,
Lippman and McCall (1976).
2.1 First Attempts
The …rst attempts to estimate the search model (Kiefer and Neumann 1979)
assumed a wage o¤er equation
wo
i = Xi¯ + "o
i (2.2)
and a reservation wage equation
wr
i = Zi° + "r
i (2.3)
with Xi and Zi representing individual characteristics that a¤ect the expected















i = ¾or. Imagine we have data from a sample of workers with infor-
mation about individual characteristics, the duration of unemployment, and the
accepted wage if the worker is employed. Clearly, the distribution of observed
wages is truncated because we observe only wages that have been accepted by
2the workers. De…ne Pi as the probability that an individual receives an accept-
able wage o¤er at a certain period. Then
Pi =P r ( wo
i ¸ wr
i) (2.4)
=P r ( Xi¯ + "o
i ¸ Zi° + "r
i)
=P r ( Xi¯ ¡ Zi° ¸ "r
i ¡ "o
i);
and the probability that an individualsearches exactly T periods is
(1 ¡ Pi)T¡1Pi: (2.5)
Pi can be estimated using data on duration of unemployment for a sample
of workers and maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). In particular, the log




log(1 ¡ Pi)Ti¡1Pi: (2.6)
Also, we observe accepted wage data. After correcting the wage equation for
selection bias as in Heckman (1979), we can estimate
wo
i = Xi¯ + E ("o




















where Á is the standard normal density function, © is the standard normal
distribution function, Á=(1 ¡ ©) = E ("o
i j Xi¯ ¡ Zi° ¸ "r
i ¡ "o
i) is the inverse
Mill’s ratio, and &i is the deviation of "o
i from its conditional expected value.
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) identify ¯, °, ¾2
o, ¾2
r,a n d¾or either by placing restric-
tions on what variables Xi enter the wage equation and what variables Zi enter
the reservation wage equation or by relying on the nonlinear functional form of
the selection bias correction term.
The Kiefer-Neumann approach to estimation of the search model uses the
restrictions imposed by equation (2.1) only as a guide for the econometric spec-
i…cation. This presents problems of consistency with the underlying theoretical
framework. In particular, the theoretical model predicts that a mean preserving
spread transformation of the wage o¤er distribution will increase the reservation
wage, that a decrease in the discount rate will imply a reduction in the reser-
vation wage, and that any anticipated change in future wage o¤er distributions
will a¤ect the reservation wage in the present as well as the future. It is not
clear how these restrictions apply in equations (2.2) and (2.3).
2.2 Structural Estimation Without Heterogeneity
More recently, researchers such as Wolpin (1987), Stern (1989), and Christiansen
and Kiefer (1991) have pursued a more structural approach in which the esti-
mation is derived explicitly from the theory. This approach incorporates the
3restrictions given by the condition of optimal search to the empirical work. The
econometric speci…cation is then fully consistent with the underlying theoretical
framework. In addition, it becomes possible to study parameters such as the
discount rate and the cost of search not otherwise present in the econometric
speci…cation.In the next paragraphs we analyze the structural estimation of the
theoretical search model previously described.
Assume, for simplicity of exposition, that we have data on duration of unem-
ployment and accepted wage o¤ers from a population of homogeneous workers
(i.e., there are no observed or unobserved characteristics a¤ecting the wage o¤er
distribution or the reservation wage). Let the distribution of wage o¤ers be F (²)
with density f (²) and let the reservation wage that solves equation (2.1) be ».
Then the probability of observing an individual with an spell of unemployment
of ti periods and accepted wage wi is
F (»)
ti [1 ¡ F (»)]
f (wi)
1 ¡ F (»)
1(wi ¸ ») (2.8)
where 1(wi ¸ ») is equal to one if wi ¸ », and it equals zero otherwise. The
…rst term, F (»)
ti [1 ¡ F (»)], is the probability that the …rst ti wage o¤ers are
rejected. The second term, f (wi)=[1 ¡ F (»)], is the density of a wage condi-
tional on it being acceptable (wi ¸ »). The last term, 1(wi ¸ »), ensures that
all observed accepted wage o¤ers are greater than the reservation wage. The







ti f (wi)1(wi ¸ »)
o
: (2.9)
For this simple speci…cation of the search model, we need to estimate », r, c,
and the parameters associated with the distribution of wage o¤ers F. The LLF
is increasing in » up until it reaches the minimum observed wage. This implies
that the MLE of » is
^ » =m i n
i=1;:::;N
wi (2.10)
Recall that ^ » i st h e… r s to r d e rs t a t i s t i cf o rt h es a m p l efwig
N
i=1 of observed
wage o¤ers, and its density is equal to N [1 ¡ F (wi j w ¸ »)]
N¡1 f (wi j w ¸ »).
Observe that the lower limit of the accepted wage o¤er distribution depends on
the reservation wage which is an estimated parameter of the model. For this
reason, the standard regularity conditions used to demonstrate the consistency
and asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimator do not apply
to this problem. However, the parameter estimates are still consistent. In
fact, under weak regularity conditions,1 ^ » is a superconsistent estimator of »;
1If the wage o¤er distribution is twice continuously di¤erentiable , then, f (») > 0 is a
su¢cient condition.
4that is ^ » converges to » at a rate faster than
p
N. The estimation approach
in this case consists of substituting ^ » in the LLF and obtaining estimators of
the remaining parameters using standard MLE applied to the resulting function.
This technique, described in Christensen and Kiefer (1991), is known as pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimation.
Using this approach we can obtain estimators for the reservation wage and
the parameters of F (²) for a large class of distributions.2 Neither the cost of
search c nor the discount rate r appear in the likelihood function. As a result, in
order to obtain consistent estimators for these parameters, we need to make use
of the restrictions implied by equation (2.1). In general, this restriction is not
su¢cient to independently identify both parameters. To illustrate this point,
consider a case where the distribution of wages is exponential with parameter








Observe that, for …xed » and ¸, there is an in…nite number of pairs (r,c)t h a t
satisfy the last equation. Then, even if we can obtain consistent estimators ^ »
and ^ ¸, the restriction implied by equation (2.11) is not enough to independently
identify r and c.
The central hypothesis of the structural search model is that agents make
optimal choices in a simple environment. From an empirical perspective, the
condition of optimal behavior imposes additional restrictions to the economet-
ric model. A test of the search theory will imply a test of these restrictions.
Unfortunately, we do not observe fundamental elements of the theory of search
like the reservation wage, the cost of search, and the discount rate (to say noth-
ing of parameters measuring heterogeneity) from the data. With this lack of
information about fundamental elements of the theoretical model, it becomes
di¢cult to construct meaningful tests of the model. Stern (1989) suggests in a
model where r and c are not separately identi…ed that one can construct the
set of combininations of r and c that are consistent with the search behavior
equation and then determine whether any elements of the set are ”reasonable”
values. This provides an informal test of the theory. Nevertheless, the di¢culty
in testing search models is probably the reason why search theory has been used
as a restriction at hand to assist with the identi…cation of the structural models
more than as a testable theory.
2In order to be able to idendify the distribution of wages from the distribution of accepted
wage o¤ers certain regularity conditions are needed. We will elaborate on this topic in the
section about rejected o¤ers. Flinn and Heckman(1982) present an extensive discussion of
this issue.
52.3 Measurement Error
A major criticism of the estimation technique described in equations (2.9) and
(2.10) is its sensitivity to measurement error. Observe that the estimator of the
reservation wage is the …rst order statistic from the sample of accepted wage
o¤ers. Order statistics are known to be very sensitive to measurement error, even
in large samples. All the parameters in the structural model are related to each
other, via the restrictions imposed by the theory. Consequently, if measurement
error is a¤ecting the estimate of », any other parameter estimated will be a¤ected
as well. Several authors have dealt with this problem by explicitly incorporating
the possibility of measurement error in the estimation of the structural model.
Among the papers that have followed this approach are Wolpin (1987), Stern
(1989), and Christensen and Kiefer (1994). All three papers assume that the
observed wages are a¤ected by random error in measurement that is normally
distributed. Stern argues that there may be two di¤erent types of measurement
error in the wage-o¤er data. First, there may be errors in reporting wages, or
in imputing tax rates or price levels. Second, the value of a job may deviate
from the observed wage because of other factors such as fringe bene…ts and
working conditions. Stern and Christensen and Kiefer present strong evidence
that measurement error is an important empirical event.
Assume wages are measured with error where wi and w¤
i represent the real
and the observed wage for individual i, respectively. In particular, suppose that
w¤
i = wi"i where "i represents a random multiplicative error with distribution
G(²), takes a positive value, and is independent of the wage o¤er. In this case,
a wage o¤er observed without error is equivalent to a situation in which "i =1 .
Notice that, for this speci…cation, it is possible to observe accepted wage o¤ers
below the reservation wage without violating the underlying theoretical model.
Observe …rst of all that the existence of measurement error does not vio-
late any assumptions of the theoretical model. Consequently, the structural
approach to inference can rely on the restrictions implied by the conditions of
optimal search. All of the papers mentioned previously have used MLE to es-
timate related models. Assume, as in the previous case, that we have data on
duration of unemployment and accepted wage o¤ers from a sample of homoge-
neous workers. The probability that a particular unemployed worker remains
unemployed for one more period is still F (»). On the other hand, in order to
obtain the density of an observed accepted wage o¤er w¤
i , it is important to real-
ize …rst that wi = w¤
i="i ¸ » because the wage has been accepted. This imposes
restrictions on the range of possible realizations of "i, "i 2 (0;w ¤
i=»].T h u s ,f o r
each w¤






for "i 2 (0;w ¤
i =»]















=[1 ¡ F (»)]:
6Therefore, the density of observed wages is obtained after integrating the pre-
vious expression with respect to " that is unobservable. That is
f¤ (w¤










(1 ¡ F (»))G(w¤
i=»)
: (2.12)
Consider a sample with N observations of the form (ti;w ¤
i ) where ti rep-
resents the length of the unemployment spell and w¤
i represents the accepted
wage o¤er, possibly observed with measurement error, for observation i.T h e






















Notice that, due to measurement error, the observed wage w¤
i is not restricted
to be above the reservation wage and can take any positive value. For this
reason, the …rst order statistic from the sample of observed wages is not an
estimator of the reservation wage. Consequently, the problem of estimation in
t h i sc a s ei sr e d u c e dt os t a n d a r dM L E .A s s u m i n gt h a tt h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fw a g e s
F belongs to a certain parametric family, in most cases we will be able to obtain
consistent estimators for the reservation wage » and the parameters associated
with F. However, neither r nor c appear in the likelihood function; estimates
of these parameters will have to be obtained from the restrictions imposed by
the theory. At this point, the problem is not di¤erent from the previous case.
As a result, these parameters cannot be independently identi…ed. Stern (1989)
presents a extensive discussion of identi…cation in a similar context.
2.4 Sample Heterogeneity
Up to this point, we have considered the case of a sample of homogeneous
individuals. In fact, workers with di¤erent characteristics may face di¤erent
wage o¤er distributions and thus have di¤erent reservation wages. Also, in
more complex search models in which workers can choose the search intensity,
workers with di¤erent characteristics may have di¤erent costs of search and, as
a result, they can optimally choose to search with di¤erent levels of intensity as
is the case in Stern (1989). We divide our discussion into the e¤ect of observed
heterogeneity and the e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity on estimation.
2.4.1 Observed Heterogeneity
Within our framework it is straightforward to account for heterogeneity. Con-
sider that Xi represents a set of characteristics associated with individual i.
Assume also that these characteristics are observed by the econometrician and
7a¤ect the distribution of wage o¤ers in a known way, F (²jXi).I nt h i sf r a m e -
work, it is simple to de…ne the LLF as an extension of equation (2.13), account-























Where »i represents the reservation wage for a worker with associated character-
istics Xi.Wolpin (1987) deals with observed heterogeneity by following the spirit
of equation (2.14). In order to reduce the computational burden, he transforms
Xi variables, usually considered to be continuous, into dichotomous variables.
Some papers divide the sample into di¤erent subsamples that contain similar
workers. For example, Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) divide the sample
into groups of younger and older workers, and Stern (1989) divides the sam-
ple by sex and education. This approach allows these papers to solve equation
(2.14) for only a small number of individuals each representing a large group
of similar individuals. This approach implies strong assumptions that are only
justi…ed for reasons of computational complexity. While the cost of computa-
tion was a reasonable concern at the time these papers were written, recent
advances in computation allow for a much less restrictive treatment of observed
heterogeneity.
2.4.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Another important issue is the existence of omitted variables or unobserved het-
erogeneity. Even after controlling for the presence of observed characteristics
Xi for individual i, there may be relevant characteristics that cannot be ob-
served from the sample, also known as unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved
characteristics are important in explaining the behavior of the worker in the
labor market. For example, workers with identical observed characteristics may
face di¤erent wage o¤er distributions and have di¤erent reservation wages due
to di¤erences in relevant unobserved characteristics. Ignoring the problem of
unobserved heterogeneity may result in biased estimators of the parameters of
t h em o d e l .B i a s e de s t i m a t e sc a nb eo b t a i n e de v e ni ft h eo m i t t e dv a r i a b l e sa r e
uncorrelated with the observed ones because of the nonlinearity of the model
and the restrictions imposed by the theory that incorporate implicit relations
among the parameters. This problem was noticed by Nickell (1979) but has not
received much attention in more recent work in this area.
One way to deal with unobserved heterogeneity is to make an explicit as-
sumption about the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.3 In particular,
assume that agent i faces a distribution of wage o¤ers F (²jXi;ºi),w i t hXi
and ºi representing the set of observed and unobserved characteristics, respec-
tively. Even if the function F (²jX;º)is known, this information is not enough
3Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity is equivalent to assuming that the distribution is de-
generate. This is a much stronger assumption than needs to be made.
8to construct the LLF because the value of º for each individual is not observed.
Assume that º is distributed according to Gº (²) and is independent of X.
Then, the contribution to the LLF of an observation (ti;w ¤
i;X i) after the e¤ect
of unobserved heterogeneity has been integrated out is
log
Z














dG" (")dGº (º) (2.15)
where G" (") represents the distribution of the measurement error, and »iº rep-
resents the reservation wage for an individual with characteristics (Xi;º).T h i s
expression can be used to construct the LLF of the sample. As was the case
with measurement error, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity does not vi-
olate any assumptions of the theoretical model. Consequently, the structural
approach to inference can rely on the restrictions implied by the conditions of
optimal search. A signi…cant problem with this approach, at least for continu-
ous unobserved heterogeneity distributions, is that the agent conditions on his
own unobserved heterogeneity when choosing a reservation wage. Thus, the
reservation wage becomes a functional. Essentially, a reservation wage must be
computed for each value of º used to compute the integral in equation (2.15).
Thus, computation costs increase signi…cantly.
The problem of unobserved heterogeneity has been ignored in most structural
models of search. The approach implied by equation (2.15) has been followed in
some of the recent papers that consider estimation of structural search models
like Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) or Engberg
(1994).4 Since the treatment of this issue here will mimic the approach taken in
a later section on equilibrium models, we postpone the detailed description of
this technique. However, it is appropriate at this point to notice that, in most
cases, it is impossible to obtain information about Gº (²). In particular, the
search theory does not o¤er any guidance about Gº (²).I ti sp r o b a b l yf o rt h i s
reason that most papers that take this problem into consideration, including
Nickell (1979), Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), Van den Berg and Ridder (1993),
or Engberg (1994), have adopted a nonparametric approach similar to Heckman
and Singer (1984b) which is discussed in Section 3.
2.5 Censoring
A right censored observation is one where the end of the spell has not occurred
by the end of the time of observation. For example, consider a sample of newly
unemployed people observed between dates ¿1 and ¿2. Any unemployment
spells that have not ended by ¿2 are right censored. For those spells, we do
not know when, if ever, they would have ended; we know only that the spell
had not ended by ¿2. An alternative cause of censoring would occur in un-
employment insurance administrative records where the individual is observed
4Eckstein and Wolpin and Engberg evaluate the reservation wage for each value of unob-
served heterogeneity. Van den Berg and Ridder have closed form solutions to equation (2.15)
that preclude evaluating the reservation wage conditional on º.
9until his UI bene…ts run out. When they run out, the researcher does not
know whether the unemployment spell ended in a job or if just the UI cover-
age ended.5 The methods for estimation of structural search models described
in the previous section can be adapted to handle right censored observations.
Consider data of the form (ti;c i;w i;X i),w h e r eti i st h eo b s e r v e dl e n g t ho ft h e
spell, ci is an indicator of whether spell i is right censored (ci =1i¤ spell i is
right censored), wi is the observed accepted wage o¤er for (uncensored) spell
i,a n dXi is a set of observed characteristics of worker i. As long as the cen-
soring process is independent from the process generating the data, the LLF
can be modi…ed straightforwardly to account for right censoring. Consider, for
example, the structural model with measurement error. The probability of ob-
serving (ti;c i =1 ;X i) is F (»i j Xi)
ti(note that no wage o¤er is observed), while
the probability of observing (ti;c i =0 ;w i;X i) is similar to the term in equation




























Equation (2.16) handles right censoring, but many data sets also have left
censored observations. In our context, left censoring appears, for example, if we
do not observe the starting time of unemployment spell. Several authors have
tried to avoid this problem by selecting data sets with special characteristics.
An early treatment of the left censoring problem can be found in Nickell (1979).
Lancaster (1990) provides a good discussion as well.
In principle, left censoring should not be a problem for the simple search
model described in this section because this model is stationary and the prob-
ability of leaving the unemployment state is independent of the time spent in
this state. However, there are examples in the literature of models in which
this is not the case. Kiefer and Neumann (1979, 1981) consider a speci…cation
that accounts for the possibility of decreasing reservation wages. Wolpin(1987)
presents a model in which agents search for a certain period of time after which
they accept the …rst wage o¤ered. This feature of the model implies decreas-
ing reservation wages. In addition, if we take into account the possibility of
unobserved heterogeneity (Nickell 1979), left censoring becomes an important
problem, even in a stationary environment. Since unobserved characteristics of
the agents a¤ect the probability of escape from the unemployment state, a sam-
ple with problems of left censoring cannot be assumed random. Consequently,
left censoring can produce inconsistent estimators even in stationary models.
5This problem could be mitigated by linking UI administrative data with wage data. How-
ever, this is not done typically.
102.6 Continuous Time Models With O¤er Arrival Rates
In the discrete time search model described in equation (2.1), the theory does
not provide any guidance for the choice of the time period length. In this sense,
this approach is somewhat arbitrary since it is time unit dependent. In order
to overcome this shortcoming some researchers have developed continuous-time
versions of the previous model. In this section we present a simple version of a
search model in continuous time. The only di¤erence between this model and
the discrete time version is in the process of wage o¤er arrivals. Other than
that, this model parallels the structure of the search model in discrete time.
Workers are in…nite-lived wealth maximizing agents, and discount the future
at a rate r. In order to receive wage o¤ers at a certain time interval ¢t,t h e
worker incurs a cost c¢t. Job o¤ers arrive from a Poisson process with parameter
®. The probability of receiving a wage o¤er in time interval ¢t is ®¢t+o(¢t);
the probability of receiving two or more o¤ers in time interval ¢t is negligible.
O¤ers are distributed according to the time-invariant density f(w) with …nite
mean. Once a job is accepted, employment lasts forever. The worker’s search
problem has the reservation wage property. Analytically, the reservation wage






wf (w)dw ¡ c: (2.17)
As in the discrete time model, this implicit equation represents the restriction
implied by the condition of optimal search.
In order to obtain estimators for the parameters of the structural model in
continuous time, it is convenient to start by de…ning the hazard function associ-
ated with the unemployment state. This function represents the instantaneous
probability of receiving an acceptable wage o¤er or equivalently the instanta-
neous probability of leaving the unemployment state conditional on not having
left yet. The hazard in this case is the product of the arrival rate ® and the
probability that the wage o¤er is acceptable to the worker 1¡F(»). The hazard
function for leaving unemployment is
¸ = ®[1 ¡ F(»)]: (2.18)
Observe that the hazard function is time independent which is a result of the
stationarity of the model. Given the hazard function ¸, the probability of an
unemployment spell of length t or less is
1 ¡ expf¡¸tg: (2.19)
This is an exponential distribution with parameter ¸,w h e r e¸
¡1 is the average
length of an unemployment spell. The associated density function will have the
11form ¸expf¡¸tg. Also, the probability of observing an accepted wage o¤er w
(with no measurement error) is
f(w)[1¡ F(»)]
¡1 1(w ¸ ») : (2.20)
Consider a sample with N observations of the form (ti;w i),w h e r eti repre-
sents the length of unemployment spell i and wi represents the accepted wage









A si nt h ed i s c r e t ec a s e ,t h ee s t i m a t o r sh a v et ob eo b t a i n e du s i n gP s e u d oM a x i -
mum Likelihood techniques because no measurement error is assumed.
This expression can be generalized to allow for right censoring and mea-




ment error as in the discrete case. In this case, the probability of observing
(ti;c i =1 ;X i) is 1 ¡ (1 ¡ expf¡¸(Xi)tig)=e x p f¡¸(Xi)tig with ¸(Xi)=
®[1 ¡ F(»i j Xi)] and »i incorporates the restriction imposed by equation (2.17)
given the distribution of wage o¤ers F (²jXi). Meanwhile, the probability of












(1 ¡ F(»i j Xi))G(w¤
i=»i)
(2.22)
This information can be incorporated to the LLF to obtain an expression similar
to equation (2.14). As in the discrete case, estimation is standard MLE.
2.7 Rejected O¤ers
With information about unemployment spells and accepted wage o¤ers, it is
possible to identify nonparametrically the distribution of accepted wage o¤ers
and the reservation wage. The distribution of observed wage o¤ers is equal to
the truncated distribution of o¤ers with truncation at point ». Since we are
primarily interested in the underlying distribution of wages, it is important to
know if the distribution of wages can be recovered from the observed distribution
of accepted wage o¤ers; this property is known as the recoverability condition.
Flinn and Heckman (1982) present a comprehensive discussion of this condi-
tion. For example, they show that the Normal and Lognormal distributions,
commonly used to describe wage distributions, satisfy the recoverability con-
dition. An example of distribution that does not satisfy this condition is the
Pareto distribution.
Flinn and Heckman argue that ”most econometric models for the analysis of
truncated data are non-parametrically underidenti…ed, and some are paramet-
rically underidenti…ed as well.” Obviously, it is possible to choose a parametric
12family for the distribution of wages such that the recoverability condition is sat-
is…ed. A simple example will su¢ce to explain why this choice is, to a certain
extent, arbitrary. Let f(w) be a density of wages, and de…ne
f¼(w)=( 1¡ ¼)f(w j w ¸ »)1(w ¸ »)+g(w)1(w<» ) (2.23)
for any ¼² (0;1), and for any density g(w) satisfying G(»)=¼.O b s e r v e t h a t
F¼(w) is a valid distribution function. In addition F¼(w j w ¸ »)=F(w j w ¸
»),a n dF¼(»)=¼. This example shows that we cannot identify nonparamet-
rically the underlying distribution of wages from the observed distribution of
accepted wage o¤ers in that there is a continuum of other wage o¤er distribu-
tions, F¼(w) for all ¼² (0;1), with the same accepted wage o¤er distribution.
In other words, given the available data we are unable to distinguish between
a labor market with a large availability of job o¤ers and a high probability
of rejection from a labor market with a small availability of job o¤ers and a
high probability of acceptance. In particular, because we do not know ®,t h e
unemployment duration data identi…es only ¸ = ®[1 ¡ F(»)] but not F(»).6
Some authors have overcome this identi…cation problem by assuming that the
distribution of wages belongs to a speci…ed parametric family satisfying the re-
coverability property. Wolpin (1987) for example, assumes that the distribution
of wages is either normal or lognormal. Other authors have …xed the number of
per period o¤ers received by the unemployed worker; once the number of o¤ers
per period is …xed, ¼ is identi…ed.
Other authors have considered data sets containing more complete infor-
mation about the search behavior of the unemployed workers. Lancaster and
Chesher (1983) and Van den Berg (1992) for example consider a sample contain-
ing a subjective measure of the reservation wage. Jensen et al. (1987) consider
a set of data that contains information about the number of applications and
number of o¤ers received. In most cases, subjective information or information
that requires a perfect recall of the past by the agents is critiqued for being not
reliable.
2.8 Structural Dynamic Models of Search
The search models presented so far have assumed a stationary environment.
In such cases, we have observed that the behavior of the workers in the labor
market can be described by a constant stopping rule. The stationary search
model has serious limitations. For example, Meyer (1990) …nds evidence for du-
ration dependence in unemployment spells even after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity (see Section 3); this can not be consistent with a stationary model.
Not many models of search in a nonstationary environment have been es-
timated. The model we describe, Wolpin (1987), will su¢ce to illustrate the
additional level of complexity added by eliminating the assumption of station-
arity from the search model. Wolpin(1987) presents a simple model in discrete
6Note that even if we assume ® =1 , there is too much freedom in choice of G(²) to
nonparametrically identify F (²):
13time. The two di¤erences of this model relative to a standard stationary model
are that a) an unemployed worker is allowed to search for a …nite number of pe-
riods T, after which, if the worker remains unemployed, he is assumed to accept
the …rst job available and b) o¤er probabilities change over time; we ignore the
second source of nonstationarity. Let Vt denote the value of search in period t
conditional on entering period t without a job:





if t =1 ;:::;T ¡ 1 (2.24)
and VT = wT. From equation (2.24), we observe that an unemployed worker at






reservation wage, and the employed worker at time T will accept any wage o¤er.
Intuitively, the reservation wage after t ¡ 1 periods of search »t is the expected
pro…t obtained from search the next period. If T is …nite, the sequence f»tg
T
t=1
is decreasing. Observe that
»T¡1 = ¡c +( 1+r)
¡1 E [w] (2.25)
and E
£
w j w ¸ »T¡1
¤
¸ E [w j w ¸ »T]=E [w].T h i si m p l i e st h a t
»T¡2 = ¡c +( 1+r)
¡1 E
£
w j w ¸ »T¡1
¤
¸ »T¡1: (2.26)
In general, assuming »T¡i ¸ »T¡i+1 for i =2 ;:::;k ¡ 1, it follows that
E
£








»T¡k = ¡c +( 1+r)
¡1 E
£
w j w ¸ »T¡k+1
¤
(2.28)
¸¡ c +( 1+r)
¡1 E
£
w j w ¸ »T¡k+2
¤
= »T¡k+1:
This proves by induction that the sequence f»tg
T
t=1 is decreasing. In this model,
the reservation wage changes through time in a systematic and recursive manner
described by equations (2.25) through (2.28).
In order to estimate the model, Wolpin assumes that wage data is observed
with measurement error. Assume lnw¤
t =l n wt + ºt where w¤
t represents the
observed wage, wt represents the true wage, and ºt represents measurement er-
ror. In order to be consistent with our previous notation, we can consider that
ºt =l n"t. By assumption, the distribution of wage o¤ers for an individual i,
14F (²jXi) is lognormal,7 and its median is a function of speci…c observed char-
acteristics of individual i, Xi; in addition, the distribution of the measurement
error G(²) is normal and independent of the distribution of wages. In this case,
the contribution to the LLF of an observation (ti;w ¤


















For each guess of the parameters in equation (2.29) and for each observation,
the sequence of reservation wages f»tg
T
t=1 is obtained from equations (2.25) and
(2.28). The value T is also chosen to optimize the value of the LLF of the
sample.
Miller (1984) and Pakes (1986) are both dynamic stopping rule models.
Miller uses a special structure to solve an occupational choice problem, and
Pakes uses a special case with simulation methods to simulate when …rms reject
the option to renew a patent. While not the same economic problem as discussed
in this chapter, they have a very similar generic structure to dynamic search
models.
3 Survival Analysis.
The analysis of duration data, also known as survival analysis, was developed
to describe the timing of events such as when a person dies (thus the name)
or when a machine breaks. These statistical techniques have become a subject
of increasing interest in economics, especially labor economics. Numerous em-
pirical papers have addressed such issues as unemployment duration (Lancaster
1979 and Nickell 1979), the e¤ects of unemployment bene…ts on the spells of un-
employment (Mo¢t 1985, Solon 1985, Meyer 1990, and McCall 1996), turnover
(Burdett et al. 1985), occupational matching (McCall 1990), retirement (Di-
amond and Hausman 1984), strike length (Kennan 1985 and Gunderson and
Melino 1990), and job search (Jovanovic 1984). Sometimes this type of tech-
nique is regarded as a reduced form for behavioral economic theories like the
theory of job search or the theory of job matching. More appropriately, it is a
‡exible approximation of behavior or an informative method of describing the
data.
Consider a random variable T which takes positive values and describes the
length of time until an event of interest occurs. Assume that the distribution
of duration T can be speci…ed by a distribution function F(t), with associated
density function f(t). Other functions of interest associated with the duration
process are the survivor function S(t)=1 ¡ F(t) which represents the proba-
bility that a spell will last a time period t or longer, and the hazard function
7Observe that, in principle, the assumption that agents accept any o¤er after T implies that
the distribution of wage o¤ers can be identi…ed nonparametricaly by observing the accepted
wage o¤ers and spell lengths after this time.
15¸(t) which represents the instantaneous probability of the spell ending at t con-















From the previous de…nition, it is evident that, given a certain density, we can
determine the associated hazard function; as we will show later on, the opposite
is also true. The derivative of the hazard function @¸(t)=@t is called the duration
dependence. If @¸(t)=@t > 0, there is positive duration dependence, and if
@¸(t)=@t < 0, there is negative duration dependence. Given the hazard rate
for a certain duration process, it is easy to determine the associated survival













0 ¸(z)dz is the integrated hazard function.
Up to this point we have considered a simple duration process that does
not depend on additional covariates. From an economic perspective, the main
concern is usually to study the impact of key exogenous variables on the distri-
bution of T. Consider a data set of the form f(ti;X i)g
N
i=1 from a population of
individuals where ti represents the spell of time until an event of interest occurs
for observation i and Xi represent a vector of characteristics for i. The distribu-
tion of duration for agent i can be speci…ed as F(t j Xi) with associated density
function f(t j Xi). Similarly, we can de…ne the survivor function S(t j Xi)=1 ¡
F(t j Xi) and the hazard function ¸(t j Xi). Furthermore, in most data sets
we should account for the possibility of right censoring. As we have already
mentioned in the previous section, this does not represent a problem as long as
the censoring process is independent of the data generating process. Consider
a sample of the form fti;c i;X ig
N
i=1,w h e r eci is an indicator of whether spell i
is censored (ci =1i¤ spell i is censored). In this case, the probability of an
observation (ti;c i;X i) will be f (ti j Xi)=¸(ti j Xi)S (ti j Xi) for ci =0and








(1 ¡ ci)log¸(ti j Xi) ¡ ¤(ti j Xi):
In empirical applications, it is common to start with the speci…cation of the
hazard function. Equations (3.2) and (3.3) show how to use ¸(t j X) to specify
the log likelihood function. Consider the following hazard function:
16¸(t j X)=¸0 (t)¸1 (X;¯) (3.4)
where ¸0 (t) is called the baseline hazard. If there is enough variation in the
X variables and all of them are observable, ¸0 (²) and ¸1 (²) are identi…ed up
to a constant. This speci…cation is known as the proportional hazard model.
It includes most of the parametric models considered in empirical applications
such as Lancaster (1979), Solon (1985), and Narendranathan, Nickell, and Stern
(1985). In this case, the function ¤(²) c a nb ew r i t t e na s




Usually ¸1 (X;¯)is modelled as expfX¯g.8 In this case we obtain
¸(t j X)=¸0 (t)expfX¯g: (3.6)
If ¸0 (t)=1 , equation (3.6) becomes the hazard function associated with an
exponential distribution with parameter expfX¯g; F (t)=1 ¡ expf¡¸1tg.
If ¸0 (t)=®t®¡1, equation (3.6) becomes the hazard of a Weibull distribution;
F (t)=1 ¡expf¡¸1t®g. The proportional hazard model does not arise from any
theoretical economic model. Its popularity is probably due to the fact that the
estimated parameters provide a straightforward interpretation: the estimated
coe¢cients are the derivative of the log hazard with respect to the associated
X variable.
Up to this point, we have assumed that all the variables that matter for
the duration process are included in X and are observed by the econometri-
cian. Even in early work (Lancaster 1979 and Lancaster and Nickell 1980),
researchers were aware that ignoring the possibility of omitted variables in a
duration model can heavily bias the included parameter estimates and lead to
misleading conclusions. To illustrate this point, suppose that the proportional
hazard model is the correct speci…cation for the study of unemployment spells.
In addition, assume that the econometrician does not observe all the variables
a¤ecting the duration of unemployment; i.e., ¸(t j X)=e x pfX¯ + "g where "
measures the e¤ect of omitted variables. For the sake of concreteness, assume
the " takes on two values, "+ >" ¡,a n dt h a tPr[" = "+]=P r[ " = "¡]=1 =2
at time zero. As the process evolves, people with high values of " (= "+) will
leave the sample faster than people with low values " (= "¡). This will change
the relative proportions of people (with respect to ") toward people with low
values of ".A st i m eg o e sb y ,s i n c et h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo f" is falling, the average
hazard rate will fall. Thus, we will observe decreasing hazards, even after con-
trolling for observed heterogeneity (the X’s) even though the hazard for each
particular worker is constant over time. Consequently, ignoring the problem of
8In particular, this speci…cation is equivalent to the one introduced by Cox (1972).
17omitted variables will lead to negative duration dependence bias. Because of
the nonlinearity of the model, it also leads to inconsistent estimates of all of the
model’s parameters (Flinn and Heckman 1982).
In order to be able to identify the e¤ects of unobservables and observables, it
is necessary to make explicit assumptions about the way in which they interact.9
Assume then that the true speci…cation of the hazard, for a certain agent i in
the sample, is as follows:
¸(t j Xi;ºi)=¸(t j Xi)ºi = ¸0 (t)¸1 (Xi;¯)ºi (3.7)
where Xi represents the set of observed variables, and ºi =e x pf"ig summarizes
the e¤ect of any other variable that a¤ects the duration process and is not
observed (unobserved heterogeneity). Then the survival function is







=e x pf¡¤(t j Xi;ºi)g(3.8)
=e x p f¡¤(t j Xi)ºig;
f (ti j Xi;ºi)=¸(t j Xi;ºi)S (t j Xi;ºi):





(1 ¡ ci)logf (ti j Xi;ºi)+ci logS (ti j Xi;ºi): (3.9)
In principle, this expression cannot be used to estimate the model because the
values of fºig
N
i=1 are not observed. This problem can be overcome if the distri-
bution generating the unobserved heterogeneity is known. Then we can de…ne
a LLF based on the marginal probabilities once the unobserved heterogeneity
has been integrated out. More precisely, assume that ºi represents a particular
realization from a distribution G(²) independent of Xi. It is usual in this case












= ¸(t j X)
Z
º expf¡¤(t j X)vgdG(º)=¸(t j X)M(1)
º [¡¤(t j X)]
9See Heckman (1991) for an iluminating review of this issue.
10Observe that this is not a restriction because a constant is included in Xi¯,a n da n y
E (º) 6=1w o u l db ec a p t u r e di nt h ec o n s t a n t .
18where Mº [²] and M
(1)
º [²] represent the moment generating function of º and
its derivative, respectively.11 We can now specify the LLF for the sample
fti;c i;X ig
N










log¸(t j X)+l o gM(1)
º [¡¤(t j X)]
o
+ ci logMº [¡¤(t j X)]:
Lancaster (1979) lets
¸(t j Xi;ºi)=®t®¡1¹iºi (3.13)
where ¹i =e x pfXi¯g and the unobserved heterogeneity has a density g(º) /
º¾¡1 expf¡º¾g.I nt h i sc a s e ,Mº [z]=[ 1¡ (z=¾)]
¡¾ and we obtain:







where ¹i =e x p fXi¯g and I(t)=
R t
0 ®t®¡1dt. From this expression, it is
straightforward to obtain f (t j X) and to construct the LLF of the sample.
Using MLE, we can obtain consistent estimators of the parameters associated
with the duration process (®;¯;¾).
It is important to recognize the signi…cance of controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. The true hazard for an individual with unobserved heterogeneity
º is
¸(t j X;º)=®t®¡1¹º: (3.15)
By controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we consistently estimate the ex-
pected hazard
¸(t j X)=Eº f¸(t j X;º)g = ®t®¡1¹: (3.16)
On the other hand, if we control just for the observed characteristics X,t h es u r -
vival function of the duration process is given in equation (3.14) with associated
hazard
11For some distributions G, the moment generating function does not exist. More generally
Mº [¡¤(t j X)] is the Laplace transform of G.
19¸
¤(t j X)=
@ logS(t j X)
@t
= ®t®¡1¹S(t j X)1=¾ = ¸(t j X)S(t j X)1=¾:
(3.17)
If we do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, we obtain a consistent esti-
mator for ¸
¤(²) in equation (3.17). As t increases, the survival probability goes
to zero and the hazard ¸
¤(t j X) decreases over time with respect to the true
hazard ¸(t j X); this con…rms our previous intuition. This argument can be
generalized easily by observing that
¸
¤(t j X)=E (¸(t j X;º) j T>t )=¸(t j X)E (º j T>t ) (3.18)
where T represents the time of employment and E (º j T>t ) represents the ex-
pected value of the unobserved heterogeneity among the remaining unemployed
workers at time t. Under the assumption that º is independent of the observed
heterogeneity, this expectation should be decreasing over time.
We have learned that it is important to take into account the possibility
of unobserved heterogeneity. This is especially true in many applications of
duration analysis to labor economics in which the concern has been to study
the e¤ect of unemployment bene…ts or the behavior of the unemployed workers
over the spell of unemployment. In this sense, we have shown that by ignoring
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in the sample, we are potentially
estimating more negative duration dependence than actually exists.
In the previous example, given data on spell duration and observed charac-
teristics of the workers, it was possible to estimate the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity, the baseline hazard, and the e¤ect of observed characteristics on
the probability of leaving the unemployment state. In order to achieve that
goal, it was necessary to make strong parametric assumptions about the form
of the hazard function and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. In
most cases, we may have little prior information about the correct distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity, and we therefore may produce misleading results
by misspecifying this distribution. It is then pertinent to ask to what extent
the available data can provide a nonparametric identi…cation of each one of the
relevant functions separately. Lancaster and Nickell (1979) …nd that ”it seems
in practice very di¢cult to distinguish between the e¤ects of heterogeneity and
the e¤ect of pure time variation in the hazard function.” Elbers and Ridder
(1982) show that, at least for the proportional hazard speci…cation, it is possi-
ble to identify nonparametrically the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
independently of the other components of the duration process as long as there
is enough variation in the observed characteristics. The intuition for this result
is that changes in the duration variable and the covariates allow us to trace
out the di¤erent components of the hazard. This result depends crucially on
the form of the proportional hazard model, in particular, the separability of
the hazard into one function of the duration, another of the covariates and the
20independence of the unobserved characteristics respect to the observed ones.12
Gurmu, Rilstone and Stern (1996) present a similar result for the proportional
hazard model allowing for the possibility of interactions between t and some
of the covariates. The identi…cation result of Elbers and Ridder (1982) and
Heckman and Singer (1984a) opens the possibility of nonparametric estimation
of the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Authors like Lancaster (1979) and Heckman and Singer (1984b) have shown
that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity can lead to biased estimates of the pa-
rameters of the hazard function. In addition, Heckman and Singer (1984b) have
shown that di¤erent speci…cations for the distribution of the unobserved hetero-
geneity can lead to very di¤erent estimates. This …nding led them to propose a
‡exible nonparametric method to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In this
paper we pursue a heuristic description of this method. Readers interested in







log¸(t j X)+l o gM(1)
º [¡¤(t j X)]
o
+ ci logMº [¡¤(t j X)]:
(3.19)
where
Mº [¡¤(t j X)] =
Z
expf¡¤(t j X)ºgdG(º) (3.20)
M(1)
º [¡¤(t j X)] =
Z
º expf¡¤(t j X)vgdG(º):
The Heckman and Singer approach consists of approximating the unknown dis-
tribution of unobserved heterogeneity G(º) with a discrete distribution with
positive probability mass at a …nite number of points. Consider then the set of
points fº1;º2;:::;ºkg with probability mass ¼j > 0 associated to ºj, j =1 ;:::;k
and
Pk
j=1 ¼i =1 . Substituting the discrete approximation of G(º) in equation
(3.20), we obtain
^ Mº [¡¤(t j X)] =
k X
j=1
¼j expf¡¤(t j X)ºjg (3.21)
^ M(1)
º [¡¤(t j X)] =
k X
j=1
¼jºj expf¡¤(t j X)ºjg
where ^ Mº [²] and ^ M
(1)
º [²] represent the approximations to the true functions,
Mº [²] and M
(1)
º [²] respectively. Substituting of the approximations, ^ Mº [²]
12A similar result in the context of risk models can be found in Heckman and Honore( 1989).
21and ^ M
(1)
º [²], for the true functions, Mº [²] and M
(1)
º (²), in equation (3.19), we






log¸(t j X)+l o g ^ M(1)
º [¡¤(t j X)]
o
+ ci log ^ Mº [¡¤(t j X)]:
(3.22)
The method proceeds by obtaining estimators of fºj;¼jg
k
j=1 and estima-
tors of the parameters of the hazard function. These estimators will be the
values that maximize equation (3.22). Observe that this problem is not a stan-
dard MLE problem because the number of parameters necessary to estimate the
approximate distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, 2k, can be in principle
in…nite and the asymptotics rely on k !1 . In practice, the estimation strategy
consists of choosing the k for which LLFk stops growing in k. Sometimes re-
searchers use a criterion such as the Aikeke number; most of the time researchers
increase k until the LLF stops growing (Card and Sullivan 1988, Gunderson and
Melino 1990, and Gritz 1993) or …x k ahead of time (Heckman and Walker 1990,
Behrmann, Sickles, and Taubman 1990, and Johnson and Ondrich 1990). One
major criticism of this approach is the lack of asymptotic distribution theory
for the parameters estimated . In practice, the results of the estimation will
depend of the parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Some authors, as for example Han and Hausman(1990) and Meyer (1990),
have shown that a non‡exible speci…cation of the baseline function ¸0 (t) can
bias the estimates of the other parameters. They suggest to estimate ¸0 (t)
semi-parametrically assuming that it can be represented as a step function.
Furthermore, these authors have argued that the biases in the proportional
hazard model may be larger for misspeci…cation of the baseline hazard than
for misspeci…cation of heterogeneity distribution. For a similar model, Sueyoshi
(1992) presents Monte Carlo evidence indicating that estimates are sensitive to
misspeci…cation of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. In addition, this
type of misspeci…cation yields biased estimates of the baseline function ¸0 (t).
In conclusion, the literature on this subject shows that both types of misspec-
i…cation are important and should be taken into account when estimating a
proportional hazard model.13
4 Empirical Equilibrium Search Models
The theoretical search models described in section two assume that unemployed
workers search sequentially for a job. The worker accepts the …rst o¤er above
his reservation wage and remains in that job forever. These models are formally
inconsistent because each (homogeneous) …rm acting optimally will o¤er a wage
which depends upon only the distribution of reservation wages. If all …rms face
13Recent papers that use this approach are Holt, Merwin, and Stern (1996) and McCall
(1996).
22the same distribution of reservation wages, each will o¤er the same wage, and
there will be a degenerate distribution of wage o¤ers. Also, there is no search
because either the worker’s reservation wage is above the common wage o¤er
and the …rst wage o¤er received is always accepted or the worker’s reservation
wage is below the common wage o¤er and he does not search. These implications
are at odds with the phenomena that these models try to explain, the search
behavior of the agents as well as the variation in wages. This inconsistency was
…rst pointed out by Diamond (1971).
In order to respond to Diamond’s critique, several authors have developed
theoretical models that depict wage (or price) dispersion and search as an equi-
librium outcome (Reinganum 1979, Albrecht and Axell 1984, Burdett and Judd
1983, and Mortensen 1990). These equilibrium models are variations of the
more simple models presented in Section 2. An important di¤erence is the in-
corporation of the optimal behavior of …rms into the models. Several options
have been suggested in order to obtain a nondegenerate distribution of wages at
equilibrium. For example, some models assume that workers may face several
job o¤ers simultaneously. In this case, workers with more than one job o¤er
are able to bargain for a wage above the reservation wage (Burdett and Judd
1983). Others depict a framework with heterogeneous agents. For example,
Albrecht and Axell (1984) assume that the …rms in the market di¤er in their
productivity and the agents, searching sequentially for a job, di¤er in their val-
uation of leisure. In this scenario, it may be optimal for …rms that di¤er in their
productivity to have di¤erent wage policies.14 Mortensen (1990) models agents
searching sequentially for a job when unemployed and when employed, moving
from a job to a new one o¤ering a higher wage. In this framework, …rms face
a tradeo¤ between short run and long run pro…ts. A …rm o¤ering high wages
keeps workers for a longer period of time than a …rm o¤ering lower wages but
extracts a smaller surplus per period from each worker. Intuitively, di¤erent
wage policies can be optimal for the …rms. As a result, the equilibrium in this
model is characterized by a nondegenerate continuous distribution of wage o¤ers
where each wage in the support of this distribution represents an optimal wage
policy for the …rm.
Equilibrium models of search have not been incorporated to the empirical
literature until recently. Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) estimate a generalization
of the Albrecht and Axell model. Eckstein and Wolpin note that ”estimating
equilibrium labor market models does not require data on both workers and
…rms, although it does require assumptions about the structure of the distribu-
tions of preferences and technology.” More recently, several other authors have
estimated the Mortensen model with homogeneous agents, or di¤erent general-
izations of this model with heterogeneous agents.
W eb e g i nt h i ss e c t i o nw i t had e s c r i p t i o no ft h eE c k s t e i na n dW o l p i nm o d e l .
Next, we present several attempts to estimate the Mortensen model. We con-
clude the section pointing out some of the shortcomings of the existing literature
14Burdett and Judd show that the model in Albrecht and Axell works only if there is a
…nite mass of people with zero search costs. One might consider this to be an unreasonable
assumption.
23and some possible avenues for future research.
4.1 Eckstein and Wolpin
Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) represents the …rst attempt to estimate an equilib-
rium model. Individuals work in a market where …rms di¤er in their produc-
tivity. All workers have the same productivity at the same …rms, i.e. they are
homogeneous with respect to their market skills, but are heterogeneous with
respect to their nonmarket productivity, or preferences for leisure. Individual
preferences and …rm productivity are private information, although the distri-
bution of preferences over individuals and the distribution of wage o¤ers are
known to all agents. There are n +1types of individuals with many people of
the same type and many …rms with heterogeneous productivities. The problem
of the worker is as described in Section 2, and each …rm maximizes intertemporal
pro…ts.
A Nash equilibrium wage o¤er distribution is shown to exist. Wage dis-
persion arises due to heterogeneity in worker tastes for leisure and di¤erences
in productivity across …rms. Di¤erent worker types have di¤erent reservation
wages. In addition values between two adjacent reservation wages are not opti-
mal wage o¤ers for the …rms. Consequently, the distribution of wages in equi-
librium has a discrete support that corresponds to the reservation wages of the
di¤erent worker types. More productive …rms o¤er high wages, attracting high
reservation wage types in addition to the low reservation wage types. The model
also predicts that an average high reservation wage worker spends more time
looking for a job and eventually obtains a higher wage; this contradicts other
theoretical models that rely on unobserved heterogeneity to generate a negative
correlation between unemployment spell length and accepted wage o¤er.
In order to be able to estimate the model, the authors introduce several
parametric assumptions about the distribution of productivity among …rms and
the distribution of workers types. The model is estimated …rst just using infor-
mation on duration of unemployment and then using information on duration of
unemployment and accepted wage o¤ers. In order to be able to …t the wage data
to a discrete distribution with n+1points of support, the authors assume that
wages are measured with errors. A novel feature of this paper is that the restric-
tions imposed by the equilibrium are incorporated to the estimation procedure.
However, any heterogeneity in productivity across workers, whether observed
or unobserved, would cause the distribution of wage o¤ers to have more than
n+1points of support. Thus, their implementation of the model relies upon an
unreasonable assumption about individuals. Both estimated equilibrium mod-
els perform poorly. In fact, measurement error accounts for almost all of the
dispersion in observed wages. Nevertheless, the model estimated with duration
data is used to simulate the e¤ects of alternative levels of the minimum wage
on unemployment and wages.
244.2 Mortensen model
In this section, we present a simple version of the equilibrium model described
in Mortensen (1990). The economy consists of a continuum of homogeneous
workers and homogeneous …rms. Firms set wages and unemployed and employed
workers search for wage o¤ers among …rms.
Workers are in…nite-lived wealth maximizing agents. Unemployment income
n e to fs e a r c hc o s ti sg i v e nb yb. Job o¤ers arrive from a Poisson process with
parameter ®u if the worker is unemployed and ®e if employed. When employed,
a worker is laid o¤ at rate ±. Assume that each worker faces a known, stationary,
nondegenerate distribution of wages F(w) with a …nite mean. Mortensen and
Neumann (1988) show that the problem of the worker can be characterized by
a reservation wage »: Analytically, the reservation wage is the unique solution
to
» = b +( ®u ¡ ®e)
Z 1
»
1 ¡ F (w)
± + ®e [1 ¡ F (w)]
dw: (4.1)
An unemployed worker accepts any wage o¤er above the reservation wage, and
an employed worker accepts any wage o¤er that exceeds his current wage.
In this framework, there is a ‡ow of workers between di¤erent states, employ-
ment and unemployment, and among di¤erent jobs. Let m denote the measure
of workers in the economy and u denote the measure of them that are unem-







u,15 the product of the o¤er arrival rate, the acceptance prob-
ability, and the measure of unemployed workers. Similarly, the instantaneous
‡ow of workers from employment to unemployment is equal to ±(m ¡ u).I ft h e









Let G(w) represent the fraction of all unemployed workers who earn wage
w or less. An expression for G(w) can be obtained at the steady state. Observe
that the measure of workers with wage less or equal to w is G(w)(m ¡ u) and
should be constant in steady state. On the one hand, the ‡ow of workers into this
group, that is those unemployed workers that accept a wage less than or equal to
w,i s®u
£




u. On the other hand, the ‡ow of workers out of this
group is the sum of those in the group who become unemployed, ±G(w)(m ¡ u)
and those who receive a job o¤er that exceeds w, ®e [1 ¡ F (w)]G(w)(m ¡ u).
Since the in‡ow and out‡ow should be equal in steady state,
G(w)=










± + ®e [1 ¡ F (w)]
: (4.3)
15The wage o¤er distribution F (²) might have a discontinuity at ». Thus, we use the
notation »¡ to indicate a wage in…nitesmally less than ».
25The distribution in equation (4.3) is useful to determine the supply of labor
to …rms. Observe that F(w)¡F(w ¡") is a measure of the percentage of wage
o¤ers within the range (w¡";w]. On the other hand, [G(w) ¡ G(w ¡ ")](m ¡ u)
is a measure of the number of workers with wages within the range (w ¡ ";w].
Consequently, the steady state number of workers per …rm o¤ering a wage w
c a nb ed e … n e da s
l(w) = lim
"!0
[G(w) ¡ G(w ¡ ")](m ¡ u)
F(w) ¡ F(w ¡ ")
: (4.4)
The steady-state pro…t ‡ow earned by a …rm who o¤ers a wage w is
¼(w;p)=( p ¡ w)l(w); (4.5)
the product of the per-worker pro…t times the steady state number of workers.
Firms maximize the steady state level of bene…ts.
In this framework, a steady-state market equilibrium is a reservation wage
» for the workers and a market wage o¤er distribution F (²). The equilibrium
conditions are that the reservation wage maximizes the expected wealth for each
worker, i.e. it satis…es equation (4.1) given F (²), and every wage o¤er in the
support of F (²) maximizes the steady state level of pro…ts of the …rm, i.e. it
satis…es equation (4.5).
Observe that …rms are allowed to make pro…ts. All …rms should earn the
same amount of pro…ts in equilibrium. Consequently ¼(w;p) should be con-
stant for any wage in the support of F (²), the distribution of wage o¤ers in
equilibrium. A nice feature of this model is that a closed form solution for F (²)











8 w 2 [»;h]; (4.6)









F (²) is continuous with connected support.16 It can be shown that the
distribution of wage o¤ers F (²) and the distribution of earnings G(²) have
increasing densities f (²) and g(²), respectively . Also, a …rm never o¤ers
wages below the reservation wage; consequently all wage o¤ers are accepted. In
addition, transitions from one job to another should result in an increase in the
wage of the worker, and wage growth on the job is not allowed.17
16Notice that, if there are a mass of employers o¤ering the same wage in equilibrium, then
it is optimal for each of these employers to increase its wage o¤er by a small amount in order
to attract workers from other employers.
17The model does not consider the possibility of entry of new …rms into the market. If we
allow for this possibility, entry will occur until the point in which pro…ts are not possible for
new entrants. In this case, the most one can do is to choose a cost of entry consistent with the
model, that is c = ¼¤
r ,w h e r e¼¤ represents the ‡ow of pro…ts at the steady state equilibrium.
264.2.1 Fit of the Model
Several authors have estimated Mortensen’s equilibrium model or generaliza-
tions of it. A rigorous analysis of the estimation and identi…cation of the model
with homogeneous agents has been conducted by Christensen and Kiefer (1994).
They show that the model can be estimated, using MLE techniques, with a data
set containing unemployment duration, reemployment wage, and job duration
from a random sample of workers.
The probability of a spell of unemployment of duration tu
i is equal to ®u expf¡®utu
i g.
Since …rms never post o¤ers below the reservation wage, o¤ers from any …rm
to an unemployed worker are always accepted. In addition, the probability of a
wage o¤er wi is equal to f (wi): The probability of an spell of employment of
duration te
i, given that the wage at the present job is wi, can be de…ned as,
(± + ®e [1 ¡ F (wi)])expf¡(± + ®e [1 ¡ F (wi)])tu
i g: (4.7)
The contribution to the likelihood function of an observation (tu
i ;w i;t e
i) is the
product of these three probabilities:
Li(µ)=®u expf¡®utu
i g¢f (wi) ¢ (4.8)
(± + ®e [1 ¡ F (wi)])expf¡(± + ®e [1 ¡ F (wi)])tu
i g
where µ =( ®u;® e;±;p;b) represents the parameters of the structural model to
be estimated:
The restrictions imposed by equilibrium are implicitly stated in equations
(4.1) and (4.5) and give rise to the closed form solution for the distribution
of wages described in equation (4.6). Observe that equation (4.6) implies that
any observed wage wi belongs to the interval [»;h]. Using the same arguments
presented in Section 2.2, we can consider the estimators ^ » = wmin and ^ h = wmax
for » and h.W h e r ewmin and wmax represent the minimum and maximum wage
observed in the sample, respectively. Assuming wages are observed without
measurement error, these estimators are consistent and converge at a rate faster
than
p
n. As explained in Section 2.2, the estimators, ^ » and ^ h, can be substituted
directly in the likelihood function. After this, we obtain an expression that
depends only on ®u, ®e,a n d±: These remaining parameters can be estimated
using MLE. Christensen and Kiefer (1994) present a more exhaustive description
of these issues.
A di¤erent way to approach this problem is to assume that wages are mea-
sured with error. This approach is essentially the same that we summarized
in Section 2.3 with the main distinction being that the distribution of wages is
obtained here endogenously. This technique has been applied to this framework
by Van den Berg and Ridder (1993).
In order to improve the …t of the model to the data, it is necessary to in-
troduce changes in the basic model allowing for the possibility of heterogeneous
27agents. Bowlus, Kiefer and Neumann (1995 a, b) consider the case of homo-
geneous workers and a …nite number of …rm types di¤ering in productivity.
Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg (1995) present a model in which the labor
market is segmented and consists of a large number of separate submarkets
within which workers and …rms are homogeneous.
Bowlus, Kiefer and Neumann (1995 a, b) assume that there are Q types of
…rms with productivity p1 <p 2 < ::: < pQ,a n dl e t¼j;j=1 ;:::;Q; represent
the fraction of …rms having productivity pj or less. This generalization of the
homogeneous model is described in Mortensen (1990).18 The equilibrium in this
case is de…ned as in the homogeneous case with the distinction that here …rms
of the same productivity should have the same pro…ts but …rms of di¤erent
productivities may have di¤erent pro…ts. Mortensen shows that the equilibrium
wage distribution is













; 8w 2 [wlj;w hj];
(4.10)
and the equilibrium implies that wl1 = »,a n dwhj¡1 = wlj 8j;t h a ti s ,… r m s
with higher productivity o¤er higher wages. The set of pairs fpj;¼jg
Q
j=1 have
to be estimated with the rest of parameters of the model. The wage policies of
di¤erent …rm types create discontinuities in the wage o¤er distribution; for this
reason, non standard techniques have to be used to estimate the model.
Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg (1995) address the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity from a di¤erent perspective. They assume that there is a large
number of separate markets in which workers and …rms meet. Within each mar-
ket workers and …rms are homogeneous, and an equilibrium wage distribution
of the form presented in equation (4.6) exists. The productivity of …rms among
di¤erent segmented markets follows a continuous distribution. They e¤ectively
have a continuum of submarkets which di¤er in the value of productivity of
workers.
The econometrician observes a mixture of the information generated in dif-
ferent markets. In particular, the value of productivity p at a certain market is
not observed by the econometrician and varies among di¤erent markets. In this
case, assuming that p » H (²) , the contribution to the likelihood function of
an observation (tu
i ;w i;t e
i) is
Z
Li (µ)dH (p) (4.11)
18The informational structure is important in order to compute the equilibrium. Here
workers and …rms know the distribution of wage o¤ers but they have no information about
each other’s type.
28with Li (µ) de…ned as in equation (4.8). The authors assume that H (p) follows
a lognormal distribution. The parameters associated with this distribution have
to be estimated jointly with the rest parameters of the model. Van den Berg
and Ridder (1993) follow a similar approach.
4.3 Policy Implications
The most common policy application of the equilibrium search models has been
the study of the labor market e¤ects of an increase in the minimum wage. Eck-
stein and Wolpin (1990) simulate the e¤ect of di¤erent values of the minimum
wage …nding that an increase in the minimum wage increases the unemploy-
ment rate as well as the expected duration of unemployment. In particular, an
increase in the minimum wage reduces the number of employers by expelling
from the market the less productive ones. This produces a reduction in the rate
of job o¤er arrival per worker and consequently increases the expected dura-
tion of unemployment per-worker. Intuitively, the same result should hold in
the model presented by Bowlus, Kiefer and Neumann (1995 a, b). Taking into
account the poor …t of the model to the data, Eckstein and Wolpin recommend
caution when interpreting their quantitative results.
Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg (1995) use data from the Netherlands to
estimate their model with only between market heterogeneity. Intuitively, this
can be interpreted as a situation in which workers with the same productivity
interact in the same market and do not have the option of moving to markets
with higher productivity. Thus, an increase in the minimum wage will result in
the closure of the markets with the lower productivity. Consequently, workers
in these markets will become unemployed without any chance of getting a job
in the future. Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg use the estimated model to
examine the e¤ect of changes in the mandatory minimum wage on the magnitude
of structural unemployment. They …nd that ”a 10% increase in the minimum
wage increases structural unemployment from 5.2% to 10.1%.”
While in Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) and Bowlus, Kiefer and Neumann (1995
a, b) an increase in the minimum wage produces an increase in the average
length of unemployment spells, in Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg (1995)
or Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) it produces an increase in the number of
workers that are permanently unemployed. This di¤erence is due to di¤erences
in the theoretical models; thus the data provides no information about which
is correct.19 These di¤erent implications about the e¤ect of an increase in the
minimum wage are relevant for policy analysis.
The e¤orts of several authors in estimating equilibrium models of search rep-
resent the most recent contributions to the empirical search literature. The equi-
librium models with homogeneous agents produce a bad …t of the data. Once
the hypothesis about homogeneous productivity on the model of Mortensen is
removed, there are several generalizations that, in principle, are not distinguish-
able and that can …t the data similarly. We see this as an unpleasant feature of
19A nonnested testing procedure would be necessary to test these models against each other.
29the existing literature; this is an issue to be addressed in future research. One
possible way to deal with this problem is to exploit richer data sets, possibly
including also information about …rm behavior. Another possible avenue of re-
search consists of investigating the nonparametric identi…cation of equilibrium
models.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The …eld of empirical search models is an important and growing …eld. There
has been signi…cant progress made in developing models to deal with measure-
ment error, observed and unobserved heterogeneity, dynamics, and equilibrium
conditions. While we have much hope for this …eld, we view there to be two
signi…cant problems to overcome in working with these models. The …rst is the
need for powerful computers. This need is being met over time although no
faster than models become more demanding of computer time. In particular,
handling observed and unobserved heterogeneity and many nonparametric and
semiparametric methods require very large computer resources.
The other problem is limited data. Presently, we are using essentially spell
length data and accepted wage data to identify all of the parameters of a search
model. In even the simplest model, such data can not separately identify a
search cost and discount rate. Allowing for important other functions implied
by unobserved heterogeneity or equilibrium may be asking too much of the
limited data available. We feel it would be useful to identify other potential
(possibly new) sources of data with direct information on possibly search cost,
rejected o¤ers, or …rm behavior.
Nevertheless, we enthusiastically encourage others to pursue this …eld. In
particular, we think there is signi…cant work to be done on identi…cation, testing,
nonparametrics, data acquisition. We are also excited about empirical imple-
mentation of equilibrium models though we see signi…cant identi…cation issues
not yet addressed.
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